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QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS AND PROGRAM EVALUATION 
STEPHEN B. WITHEY 
University of Michigan 
ABSTRACT 
Social indicators and program evaluation research have much in common. Quality of ltfe work 
specifically raises the question of objective versus subjective variables, aggregate data versus 
distributional and individual issues, and the reference standards used in judgment and evalua- 
tion decisions. This articlepresentsperspectives on these issues from the orientation of quality 
of life research and proposes that these approaches have relevance for program evaluation 
work. 
Social indicators research is about the same age as 
evaluation research. Both have the same disciplinary 
origins in economics, sociology and social psychology. 
Both areas of activity are engaged in collecting statistics 
of direct normative interest, the assessment of social 
change or stability and the detection of factors effective 
in achieving social and policy goals. Historically, 
evaluation research has focused on specific program- 
matic efforts while social indicator research has tried to 
assess a wider mix of societal variables and contexts. 
Both, however, are interested in the complex structure 
of networks of interacting variables and the effects of 
directed policy and social programs in the flow of less 
purposeful social trends. Both expect the dissemination 
and understanding of their results to be followed by 
some cognitive shift with behavioral or policy conse- 
quences. Thus one can look for considerable overlap in 
the problems and issues arising in each area of research. 
OBJECTIVE VERSUS SUBJECTIVE MEASURES 
Certainly one of the major controversies in social in- 
dicator studies is the role of objective versus subjective 
variables. Disciplines and people within them differ in 
their emphasis on “hard” data. There are differences 
too in the conceptualization of well-being and welfare 
and measurement problems are always with us. For- 
mulators of the social indicators movement (Bauer, 
1966; Olson, 1969; Sheldon&Moore, 1968; and others) 
were initially concerned with the inadequacies of social 
data and the resulting lack of insights into social func- 
tioning. Part of the lack of understanding was 
associated with the realization that in spite of improve- 
ment in physical well-being the quality of life had not 
uniformly improved. This occurred because of a new 
mix of objective factors and a shift in standards for 
judgment as expressed in the ideal of a revolution in 
aspirations and expectations. At any rate the social in- 
dicators effort rapidly led to research in the quality of 
life and this work partly emphasized subjective 
judgments and evaluations. 
Economists have been interested in aggregate output. 
The GNP is a product that itself engenders arguments 
as to the adequacy of its assessment of societal well- 
being. These aggregate measures dodge any distribu- 
tional issues about differences in well-being within a 
society. This stems from the refusal of economists, in 
general, to make interpersonal comparisons of utility or 
well-being. From this posture the emphasis on ag- 
gregate production or consumption is understandable. 
The GNP-type “goods” are presumably instrumental in 
securing, in turn, actual “objects” of utility; but in 
tracking the productive process it is not teacher salaries 
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but achieved pupil skills that are the product; it is not 
money for hospitals but health that constitutes welfare; 
it is not money spent on construction but the quality of 
the neighborhood that is well-being. Carrying the argu- 
ment further, the objective products of production or 
of a program are hopefully satisfaction, improvement 
and well-being. It is this pressure to account for social 
efforts in terms of their final and intended product that 
leads some to wrestle with the conceptual, measurement 
and interpretation problems associated with the assess- 
ment of subjective states of well-being now collectively 
termed the quality of life. 
Policies and programs create a sequence of effects or 
products. Although one can stop with assessing pro- 
gram goals of reduced days in hospital, fewer arrests, 
better scores on tests, etc., there is a sense in which 
many of these programmatic goals also end up in sub- 
jective support, appreciation and understanding. If 
not, the program may be in trouble. 
A classic example of the problems of objective and 
subjective factors, aggregate and individual 
characteristics and different reference standards is of- 
fered by Easterlin (1973). He found that rising levels of 
income do not produce increases in the average subjec- 
tive estimate of welfare. From studies in 19 countries he 
reports that “in all societies, more money for the in- 
dividual typically means more individual happiness. 
However, raising the incomes of all does not increase 
the happiness of all. Individuals assess their material 
well-being, not in terms of the absolute amount of 
goods they have, but relative to a social norm of what 
goods they ought to have. Rainwater (1974) 
documented a reference norm by citing 18 studies be- 
tween 1946 and 1969 in which the “smallest amount of 
money a family of four needs to get along” increased by 
a factor of 1.36 between 1954 and 1969 using constant 
1971 dollars. Duncan (1975) replicates this finding 
reporting that “there was no change in the distribution 
of satisfaction with the standard of living among 
Detroit wives between 1955 and 1971, although current- 
dollar income increased by forty percent. Cross- 
sectional variation in satisfaction is, however, related to 
income and, in particular, to relative position in the in- 
come distribution.” 
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SUBJECTIVE MEASURES? 
No brief review can cover the extensive work now going 
on under the title social indicators, social accounting or 
quality of life. Only an example is offered from the 
author’s own work (Andrews & Withey, 1976) but it 
does illustrate some of the possible payoffs from quali- 
ty of life research. The conceptual model proposes that 
a person’s overall sense of life quality is understandable 
as a combination of evaluative responses to life “do- 
mains” (areas of activity). Over 100 items were used to 
measure a very wide variety of domains and several 
items were used to assess perceived overall life quality. 
These items were used in interviews with several 
representative samples of American adults. Based on 
these data the domain items were grouped (by correla- 
tional association) into a smaller number of semi- 
independent clusters. Thus, using smallest-space- 
analysis or cluster analysis one can develop a structural 
picture, like a tinker toy, of people’s evaluations of life 
domains. This cluster structure was stable across 10 dif- 
ferent subgroups of the adult population and were 
highly replicable in independent national samples. 
Analyses from more than one survey showed that 12 do- 
mains explained 50-60% of the variance in an index of 
overall life quality. Also, additive combinations of 
satisfaction in domains worked as well as more com- 
plicated models of combinatory rules. 
What does this mean? Among other conclusions 
these findings indicate that components of family 
satisfaction tend to correlate (cluster); so do com- 
ponents of job satisfaction, income, standard of living 
and personal accomplishment tend to cluster, as do 
neighborhood variables and so forth. These data also 
show that family satisfaction is more important in 
overall evaluation than is job or neighborhood satisfac- 
tion. They also show that even though evaluations of, 
for instance, local commercial services are not terribly 
influential in overall evaluations they, as a cluster, do 
contribute something as do assessments in another 
cluster, the activity of the national government. This 
degree of consistent organization may be a bit surpris- 
ing but it does provide a context for judging how 
changes in the physical and social environment may in- 
fluence subjective judgments of well-being and quality 
of life. Some areas (domains) of life will contribute 
much more to people’s sense of well being than others 
and the amount of contribution can be fairly consistent- 
ly quantified. 
If any aspect of quality of life is a component of pro- 
gram or policy evaluation this context and structure for 
people’s subjective evaluation is important to know. 
Such a structure provides a forecast of the likely impact 
of improved satisfaction in some domain on overall im- 
provements in judged quality of life. It certainly in- 
hibits excessive optimism or discouragement. 
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WHAT DETERMINES SUBJECTIVE WELFARE? 
Assuming that cognitive judgments have some impor- Other models may deal with distributional reference 
tance for peoples’ behavior, for their feelings about standards. Above the mean or in the top 10% are 
themselves and their world and for others’ attempts to evaluative judgments within this context. The relevant 
improve conditions, what is the key to understanding distribution may be an individual’s history or ex- 
subjective judgments? Human judgments tend to be periences or it may be a distribution for a group. Par- 
relative. Relative to what? From the days of psycho- ducci (1965) proposes the idea of a neutral judgment 
physics judgment has been seen as occurring in a con- point that depends on the distribution of positive and 
text in which some standard or range is used as a negative outcomes. Specifically the reference point is 
reference. If people are asked to judge a program to proposed to fall halfway between the mid-point of the 
reduce highway accidents, program achieved accident range of outcomes and the median outcome over a 
figures are compared with pre-program rates. If the lat- period of experience. It is hypothesized that this is a 
ter are higher there is some degree of satisfaction with compromise between the extremes of experience and 
the program depending on the size of the arithmetic dif- the pattern of actual or typical experiences. An implica- 
ference. If researchers ask respondents how pleased or tion of this model is that people will be more pleased 
satisfied they are with various areas or activities in their with negatively skewed outcomes than positively 
lives, a statement of“fairly satisfied” means something, skewed ones. In negatively skewed distributions over 
but more insight is gained if one knows the standard half of the outcomes will be above the “psychologically 
used for such a judgment. Even if there are troubles in neutral point.” Other models use ratio adaptation 
quantification and measurement it is helpful to know levels, and various multiple point references. Others 
something about the reference standard. could be invented. 
Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) have tried 
the model of aspirations. For most people achievement 
will not reach aspirations so satisfaction becomes a 
matter of the smallness of the discrepancy between 
present and aspired conditions. A similar model among 
policymakers is one that uses as a reference standard 
some minimal figure such as acceptable rate of unem- 
ployment. However, another model uses a minimal 
figure such as minimum wage or poverty level income 
and assumes that satisfaction increases as the 
discrepancy between income and standard gets larger. 
Since quality of life research and evaluation research 
involves similar problems and issues it would seem that 
they might profitably contribute to each other. “Quali- 
ty” implies “Evaluation” and standards for com- 
parison, and pattern and quantity, and combination 
rules, and weighting, and aggregate and distributional 
outcomes, and extra-individual and intra-individual 
phenomena. The methodologies and the findings 
should be mutually valuable to both research orienta- 
tions. 
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